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 3. 
Agents of Change?  Gender Advisors in NATO militaries 
 
Abstract 
This paper is about the experiences of Gender Advisors in NATO and partner 
militaries, and the question of whether militaries can contribute to a feminist vision of 
peace and security. Gender Advisors are increasingly being adopted as a mechanism 
to help militaries to implement commitments under the Women, Peace and Security 
agenda. Based on semi-structured interviews and a workshop with individuals 
working as Military Gender Advisors from 2009 to 2016 in Afghanistan, Kosovo and 
in NATO and national military commands and headquarters, this paper explores their 
own perceptions of their work, its goals, shortcomings and achievements.  It 
highlights Military Gender Advisors’ strong commitment to Women, Peace and 
Security aims, but the resistance their work faces within their institutions, and 
challenges of inadequate resourcing, preparation and contextual knowledge. Military 
Gender Advisors’ experiences paint a picture of NATO and partner Militaries having 
in some places made progress in protection and empowerment of local women, but 
fragile and partial. These findings speak to wider debates within feminist security 
studies around whether and how militaries achieve human security in peacekeeping 
operations, and the risks of militarisation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.  
Keywords feminist security studies; military; gender; NATO; peacekeeping; Afghanistan 
 
 4. 
Introduction 
NATO has been developing its approach to implementing the UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCRs) on Women, Peace and Security since 2007, placing the use of 
Military Gender Advisors both in headquarters and on operations at the centre of its efforts. 
The remit of Military Gender Advisors is, in broad terms, to enable militaries to respond to 
the demands of these resolutions: to protect women and girls from the harms of armed 
conflict, to ensure women’s participation in efforts to build peace and security, and to support 
gender equality within their own force. In this research, we have captured the reflections of 
21 Military Gender Advisors working within different NATO and partner militaries, 
structures and operations over a seven-year timespan. We consider what their experiences tell 
us about military engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. 
From just a handful of Gender Advisors within NATO a decade ago, NATO now claims to 
have a well-functioning, fully established and financed network of Military Gender Advisors 
across the civilian and military elements of its institutions and field commands 
(Coomaraswamy 2015, 258). Within the national militaries of NATO member and partner 
nations, as at the end of 2016, 696 Military Gender Advisors had been trained.1 The Gender 
                                                             
 
1 Noting that these figures are based on self-reporting by nations to NATO. Not all of the Gender Advisors 
reported as ‘trained’ would have completed NATO’s accredited training scheme, and the quality and rigour of 
nations’ Gender Advisor training varies.  
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Advisor role has been created in at least 30 armed forces: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Georgia, 
Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and 
the United States (NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor 2017). Gender expertise now 
being a designated a ‘NATO capability,’ one can expect other NATO, partner and allied 
armed forces to follow suit.2 The UN is emulating NATO’s approach, expanding the 
deployment of Military Gender Advisors in peace operations.3 A number of African 
peacekeeping militaries (including Cameroon, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa 
and Uganda) have developed Gender Advisor roles or sent personnel to NATO Gender 
Advisor training. As such, what we can learn from the experiences of Gender Advisors within 
a NATO context - what they have been able to achieve, and the factors that inhibit them - is 
of practical importance to a wide range of militaries, and has bearing on the broader question 
of whether militaries can meaningfully support the Women, Peace and Security agenda. 
The following section of this paper gives a short overview of the Women, Peace and Security 
agenda, outlining its goals around protection, participation, prevention, relief and recovery. It 
                                                             
 
2 Through NATO’s Defence Planning Process, Allies must report to NATO every two years on how they are 
developing gender capability, as part of harmonising their national defence plans with those of NATO (Private 
meeting, NATO Headquarters, 30 May 2016).  
3 As of March 2017, the UN had a Military Gender Advisor within seven of its peacekeeping missions (Private 
correspondence with UN DPKO Military Gender Officer, 16 March 2017). 
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explores tensions between a demand that military operations adopt a more feminist vision of 
security, and concern that involving militaries in achieving goals around Women, Peace and 
Security militarises and thus denigrates these efforts. It highlights particular critique of 
framing NATO as an actor credibly able to pursue a feminist project. The paper then 
proceeds to discuss why, in light of the foregoing, it is important to listen to NATO’s Gender 
Advisors, and what this research adds to scholarship that has engaged with them. The 
subsequent sections then trace the evolution of the role of Gender Advisor within NATO and 
analyse how Gender Advisors’ goals, as they describe them, conform to the key dimensions 
of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. We explore how Gender Advisors describe their 
achievements, both in terms of impacts upon their own institution and (where in mission) 
upon local security and women’s empowerment. We then examine the challenges they 
described, and the inhibitors of their work. In our conclusions, we reflect upon the 
implications of these findings for broader conceptual debates around military involvement in 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda. 
Military engagements with feminism; feminist engagements with militarism  
The UN Security Council has, at the time of writing, adopted eight UNSCRs on Women, 
Peace and Security, defining what has come to be referred to as the ‘Women, Peace and 
Security Agenda’.4 Although wide ranging, the unifying goals of the Women, Peace and 
Security Agenda are to strengthen the protection of women and girls from sexual and other 
                                                             
 
4 UNSCR 1325 (2000); UNSCR 1820 (2008); UNSCR 1888 (2009); UNSCR 1889 (2009); UNSCR 1960 
(2010); UNSCR 2106 (2013); UNSCR 2122 (2013) and UNSCR 2242 (2015). 
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forms of violence in conflict-affected contexts; promotion of participation of women in 
conflict-resolution and peacebuilding; and to increase the their role in decision making 
regarding the prevention and resolution of conflict. There are also a range of commitments 
linked to relief and recovery processes: meeting women and girls’ needs, and fostering 
women’s participation. 
The texts of the resolutions refer directly to armed forces in a range of ways, including 
increasing the representation of women at decision-making levels within defence institutions; 
gender-responsive demobilisation programmes; vetting of armed and security services; 
training of peacekeepers on gender, women’s rights and protection; deployment of more 
female peacekeepers; and prevention and accountability for sexual exploitation and abuse. In 
many states where National Action Plans have been developed to guide implementation of 
the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, the Ministry of Defence is one of the responsible 
executive bodies. Amongst NATO nations, many National Action Plans contain provisions to 
increase women’s representation in the armed forces and military operations; and on training 
for the armed forces around women, peace and security and, in some cases, ‘gender 
perspectives’ (Reeves 2013, 15–16). Indeed, according to their own reporting to NATO, more 
than 96% of NATO member nations include gender in pre-deployment training and exercises, 
77% include gender in operational planning, and 80% provide education and training 
programmes related to gender (NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor 2017, 33). 
NATO adopted its first policy on Women, Peace and Security in 2007. The policy’s guiding 
rationale was presented as ‘improv[ing] the effectiveness of NATO-led Operations and 
Missions to ensure overall mission success … ensur[ing] that maximum effect can be drawn 
from incorporating gender perspectives into NATO’s approach’ (NATO/EAPC, 2007). This 
strategic framing of Women, Peace and Security as a tool to make NATO more effective is 
 8. 
problematic for many feminists, as discussed below. This and subsequent NATO policies on 
Women, Peace and Security have been adopted not only by the (now) 29 NATO members, 
but through the 50-member Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a multilateral forum 
for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues among NATO Allies and 
partner countries. In 2008, NATO’s highest governing body tasked the Strategic Commands 
to provide a set of guidelines on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NATO 2010), which 
led to the September 2009 Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1 on Integrating UNSCR 
1325 and gender perspectives in the NATO command structure. This directed gender 
mainstreaming ‘in order to improve operational effectiveness’ and as a ‘force multiplier’ 
(NATO 2009, para. 1.3, 1.4). Further guiding practical implementation, in 2010 the EAPC 
adopted an Action Plan for the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace 
and Security. NATO’s Policy on Women, Peace and Security was revised in 2011 and 2014; 
the Action Plan likewise in 2014 and 2016.5 Both the Policy and Action Plan are being 
revised again in 2018. It is thus clear that NATO has embraced the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda, but the significance and value of this engagement is hotly debated.  
Militaries are viewed by many feminist scholars as fundamentally inimical to feminism, 
institutions of destructive power and inherent misogyny (for a full account of their critique, 
see Duncanson 2017). Militaries perpetrate devastating violence in war, which 
disproportionately affects women when the long term impacts, including of forced migration, 
                                                             
 
5 For a more detailed overview of NATO’s policy development around Women, Peace and Security, see Wright 
(2016). 
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and sexual and gender-based violence are considered (Rehn and Johnson Sirleaf 2002; 
Ormhaug et al. 2009). Even where described as ‘pacifying’ or ‘liberating’ missions, military 
interventions remain violent, for some feminists, often ‘wars of extraction’ (Peterson and 
Runyan 2013, 143), involving the logic of all war: ‘opposition, differentiation and the 
othering of peoples’ (Eisentsein 2007, 25; see also Whitworth 2004).   
As well as perpetrating direct physical violence, militaries are implicated in equally 
pernicious structural violence. States’ military-industrial complexes organise economies 
around producing weapons rather than civilian goods and absorb vast amounts of funding that 
could otherwise be spent on achieving human security (Peterson and Runyan 2013, 159; 
Cockburn 2007, 239). The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) 
highlights the opportunity-costs at play: the world’s total military expenditure in 2013 was 
estimated to be $1.747 trillion (WILPF 2014, 2). Only a small fraction of that would be 
required to fund the measures to achieve the Millennium Development Goal for gender 
equality, such as women’s economic empowerment, family planning, and women’s 
participation and leadership.  A feminist vision of peace and security, as articulated by 
WILPF and reflected in feminist scholarship, is for ‘a world free from violence and armed 
conflict in which human rights are protected and women and men are equally empowered and 
involved in positions of leadership at the local, national and international levels,’ hand in 
hand with universal reduction and elimination of weapons (WILPF 2018), suggesting a vastly 
reduced (if any) role for armed forces and military alliances.  
Militaries are, moreover, viewed by many feminists as an institution where hegemonic forms 
of masculinity privileging practices of violence and misogyny, combined with myths of 
heroic protection of vulnerable civilians, are produced and reproduced (see for example, 
Connell, 1995; Cockburn and Enloe 2012). Militarized masculinity, constructed within 
 10. 
militaries but with effects rippling through society, is theorised as focused upon domination 
of women (and subordinate males) and the denigration of the feminine (Whitworth 2004). 
Indeed, many scholars argue that the capacity of women within the military to be agents of 
change of institutional culture or of military operations is limited, as they adapt their 
performance of femininity to fit their hyper-masculine environment (Weinstein 1999; King 
2013). They likewise question claims that women make a distinct contribution as military 
peacekeepers: to protection of women and girls, prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, 
or as role models for local women (Jennings 2011; Heinecken 2015; see discussion in 
Duncanson and Woodward 2015).  As Heineken says, ‘Clearly one cannot bring about a 
different perspective to war and peace if women [in the military] are expected to embrace 
masculine norms and values and where gender difference is not recognised and valued’ 
(Heinecken 2017, 364).  
As such, it is unsurprising that some feminist scholars and activists are sceptical of military 
engagement with the Women, Peace and Security agenda. They suggest that when taken up 
by militaries, the Women, Peace and Security agenda risks being used to lend legitimacy to 
the ‘war system’ rather than challenge it (Cohn 2008; Cockburn 2012; Otto 2016), even 
‘militarizing feminism’ (Wright 2015). NATO is regarded with particular suspicion; by 
‘Women Against NATO’ as ‘an ambitious, expansionist and belligerent war-machine, 
primarily serving the economic and strategic interests of the more powerful among its 
member states’ (Cockburn 2012, 50). From this perspective, NATO invoking women’s rights 
is not progress, but the co-optation of feminism for militarist ends. More specifically, some 
feminists allege that NATO’s gender work too often carries the implication that gender is 
only relevant for the host country, as if western institutions had achieved gender equality; that 
it perpetuates colonial assumptions about the superiority of the west as the bearer of 
civilization and humanitarian values (see for example Khalili 2011; Kronsell 2012; Pratt 
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2013; Mesok 2015). One imagines that anti-militarist feminists would argue that Military 
Gender Advisors are either not-feminist or feminists wasting their time, legitimising 
fundamentally problematic institutions.  
Conversely, a more optimistic perspective explores whether militaries can be transformed to 
be better able to engage with and address the security needs of women, girls and boys. 
Cockburn and Hubic asked, could soldier identities and military culture be ‘regendered’: 
transformed inter alia so to allow soldiers to be more responsive and caring; to be respectful 
of women; to have gender on the agenda (2002, 117–8)? Duncanson and Woodward (2015) 
develop the implications of such regendering as involving a disruption and deconstruction of 
gendered masculine/feminine hierarchies in ways that could enable militaries to contribute to 
feminist visions of security. Advocating for regendering of militaries builds on the accounts 
of feminists, such as Mary Katzenstein (1999), who have been attentive to the small gains 
won by women within the military over decades of protest. It considers, also, that many 
militaries have shifted focus in the post-Cold War period from wars of national defence to 
support for peace and security (Kronsell 2012; Moskos et al. 2000). This arguably opens 
opportunities for new approaches to all aspects of military culture and activity. More 
urgently, where there are situations of such dire insecurity that local men and women actively 
ask for and support an international military presence (as Cockburn and Hubic noted to be the 
case in Bosnia Herzegovina, for example), and where militaries are actively reaching out to 
local women, we argue that they deserve our attention and critical encouragement. We argue 
that there is potential for militaries to contribute to women’s security in communities in 
which they are deployed, and to become more invested in and capable of facilitating feminist 
visions of security. Is this optimism or naivety? The reader will judge. In doing so, the 
experiences and perceptions of Military Gender Advisors, we argue, contribute missing and 
important evidence. 
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Why explore Military Gender Advisors’ perspectives? 
A central strategy of feminist methodology is woman-centredness as a political and 
intellectual approach. Tickner talks of using women’s experiences of an indicator of the 
‘reality’ against which research questions are formulated (cited in Ackerley et al., 2006, 26). 
We feel that this demands that the experiences of military women are listened to in 
researching military roles in relation to Women, Peace and Security. Other scholars exploring 
military engagements with Women, Peace and Security have touched upon the work of 
Military Gender Advisors. Their insights guided and enriched our research and are 
incorporated into our discussion of our findings. Scholarship to date, however, has been 
limited to research with Gender Advisors from the Netherlands (Kesteloo 2015) or Sweden 
(Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 2009; Egnell, Hojem, and Berts 2012; 
Longworth and Engdahl, 2014) or with a very small sample (Hurley, 2016). Lackenbauer and 
Langlais’ key Review of the Practical Implications of UNSCR 1325 for the Conduct of 
NATO-led Operations and Missions (2013) was commissioned by NATO and led by the 
entity responsible for training of NATO Gender Advisors, which might mitigate against 
Gender Advisors being frankly critical of themselves or their institutional arrangements. 
Indeed, there is a dissonance between the largely encouraging ‘official’ NATO version of 
Gender Advisors’ impact, and more pessimistic accounts emerging from independent 
scholars. As such, research conducted under more robustly anonymous conditions was 
needed, as well as research drawing upon a wider pool of nations.  
This research involves 21 participants: 19 former or current Military Gender Advisors or 
Gender Field Advisors, plus two individuals with similar roles in military headquarters. They 
are from four NATO member militaries and two NATO Partner militaries. 16 had been 
deployed as part of NATO operations in Afghanistan between 2009 and mid-2016; one 
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deployed as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR); two were based in permanent NATO 
commands in Europe; and two were based in national military headquarters. Of the 16 who 
had been in Afghanistan, at least four continued to work on gender issues in their military 
institutions at home. As such, this sample captures experiences of being a Gender Advisor in 
national and operational headquarters, and in the field, with three quarters of the sample 
speaking predominately about experiences in Afghanistan. 18 participants were female, three 
male; 19 were uniformed military personnel; two were civilians working within military 
structures. Participants were initially approached and identified through our professional 
networks, and from these initial contacts, snowball sampling. 11 were interviewed between 
February 2015 and June 2016; the other 10 were a group of Gender Advisors who came 
together in September 2016 to reflect upon their experiences. Because the community of 
Military Gender Advisors remains small and many of our participants continue to work with 
their militaries, we committed to keep confidential both their name (by using pseudonyms) 
and their armed force.  
Whilst the sample for this research is modest, it offers analysis of the experience of Gender 
Advisors from a more diverse range of nations and operational contexts, and over a longer 
period than existing research. At a critical juncture in the development of Gender Advisor 
functions within NATO and Partner militaries, it offered Gender Advisors safe space in 
which to reflect deeply upon their role. The following presentation and discussion of findings 
from our interviews and observation focuses upon Gender Advisors’ goals, and what they 
considered their achievements and challenges. While Gender Advisors themselves cannot 
speak to their success at achieving the goals of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in any 
conclusive sense – their perceptions are necessarily partial and subjective - they are well-
placed to offer observations about the extent to which they and their roles have made a 
difference. What they had to say we found, at times, surprising, troubling and humbling. 
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The role and goals of NATO Military Gender Advisors 
UN peacekeeping missions have had gender advisors since 2000, but traditionally civilians, 
working closely with human rights elements of the mission. 2006 saw the first appointment 
of a Gender Advisor within the military structure of a European Union multinational 
operation (EU Operation Headquarters 2006), and NATO shortly after adopted the Gender 
Advisor function. Since 2008, NATO Gender Advisors have been deployed in Afghanistan as 
part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and then Resolute Support 
Mission, and since late 2010 also in KFOR. As a snapshot: during 2016, there were 33 
Gender Advisors deployed in NATO operations or missions; plus 24 part-time Gender 
Advisors (Gender Focal Points) within the headquarters of Resolute Support Mission and 63 
in the KFOR headquarters and subordinate units (NATO Public Diplomacy Division 2017, 
59).  
This section presents how the role of Military Gender Advisor has evolved within NATO 
operations and structures, and what their goals are formally conceived to be, considering how 
they align with those of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. It then draws out how the 
Military Gender Advisors we interviewed and observed themselves understand their goals. 
Evolution of the Gender Advisor role and its formal goals 
The first NATO Gender Advisors were deployed by Sweden in July 2008 and by Norway in 
2009, each to their nation’s Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan. These Military 
Gender Advisors had both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ roles: that is, advising the commander and 
supporting analysis and planning within the Provincial Reconstruction Team, and cultivating 
external contacts with Afghan women. The Gender Advisor role was institutionalised within 
NATO in the September 2009 Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1. This envisioned Gender 
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Advisors in both NATO command headquarters and in operations (at the time, the largest 
being in Afghanistan and Kosovo), missions and exercises. Gender Advisors’ role was to 
‘ensure integration and a common understanding of UNSCR 1325 and gender dimensions’ 
(NATO 2009, paras. 1–11) and ‘to provide expertise on UNSCR 1325, women and gender 
perspectives, and cultural awareness’ (para 1-9. b.) The Directive presented a confusing mix 
of terminology (integrating gender dimensions, gender awareness, gender perspective, female 
perspectives, gender equality), jumbling together ideas around female personnel bringing 
distinctive perspectives to NATO operations, and ‘gender perspective’ in terms of gender 
analysis of an operational context. A vast array of responsibilities for the Gender Advisor was 
specified. They were to assist commanders in planning, conduct and evaluation of operations; 
input into meetings and reviews; and conduct gender and UNSCR 1325 assessments. They 
were to establish a system of gender education and training. They were to be involved in 
internal human resources; standards of conduct; intelligence and medical and logistics 
aspects. They were to establish and maintain contacts with NATO gender structures, 
international organisations, and international and local NGOs. In an organisation where 
functional specialisation is the norm, expecting one individual’s skills, knowledge and 
capacities to span so widely is extraordinary. Early analysis of the work of Swedish Gender 
Field Advisors indeed observed that the wide-ranging areas in which the mission needed 
gender expertise could place an unreasonable workload on one person (Olsson and Tejpar 
2009). The Directive specified that Gender Advisors should have ‘gender expertise’ and be 
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trained and qualified, although at that time no specific training or qualifications existed.6 In 
terms of how the Gender Advisors’ role contributes to the goals of UNSCR 1325 outlined 
above, there is an emphasis on women’s participation as NATO personnel; but not on 
promoting participation and empowerment of local women. There is a focus on protecting 
women and girls from violence, including sexual violence, with oblique references to 
protection from, and prevention of, sexual exploitation and abuse by NATO personnel. 
However, the ‘operational effectiveness’ framing is dominant. For example, the Directive’s 
illustration of a Gender Advisor’s ‘gender and UNSCR 1325 assessments’ is of ‘cultural 
issues which may impact operations effectiveness, intelligence, etc.’ (para 1-11. h.), rather 
than of using an assessment to prevent violence or to protect someone. 
NATO Gender Advisors’ roles were reconfigured in an August 2012 revision of Bi-Strategic 
Directive 40-1 (NATO 2012). The revised Directive rationalized somewhat its concepts to 
emphasise ‘integration of gender perspective’; described as assessing the differences between 
women and men, as reflected in social roles, distribution of power and access to resources, 
with the aim of considering their needs and how the activities of NATO have different effects 
on them (para 1-4. c.). Moreover, it is specified that ‘integration of gender perspective’ 
follows gender analysis, defined as: ‘systematic gathering and examination of information on 
gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand inequities based on 
                                                             
 
6 The Swedish Armed Forces offered a Gender Advisor course to international participants from October 2009, 
but this was not NATO certified until 2011. An e-learning course on gender perspectives for personnel 
deploying to ISAF was launched in late 2010.  
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gender’ (para 1-4. d.) Mandatory and recommended training paths for Gender Advisors 
working at strategic, operational or tactical levels were specified, combining a newly 
developed e-learning course for Gender Advisors, classroom learning at the new Nordic 
Centre for Gender in Military Operations in Sweden, and participation in military exercises. 
Gender Advisors’ areas of responsibility expanded further, to encompass conflict-related 
sexual violence, engaging with child rights organisations, and conducting ‘frequent and 
flexible engagement’ not only with local women but with local men (NATO 2012, A-2). 
Further new tasks included: supporting recruitment and retention of women in local security 
forces; supporting investigations of alleged violence or sexual abuse by NATO personnel; 
advising on gender dimensions in the local judicial system; ensuring women were part of 
NATO’s regular force structure; advising on national pre-deployment training; and advising 
on how buildings and communications structures within military compounds might impact 
upon gender relations. The access that a Gender Advisor needs to do their job is better 
specified: they should have direct access to the Commander, always be a member of a 
planning group, and be able to advise wherever they consider it appropriate.  
A third iteration of Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1 on Implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 1325 and Gender Perspective was agreed in May 2017. This appears to reorient 
the Gender Advisor’s role as primarily guidance and coordination, with an emphasis on 
reporting and analysis. The dizzying array of tasks in earlier versions of the Directive are now 
identified as the responsibilities of the staff working in those areas. However they remain 
embedded in the chapter of the Directive listing the Gender Advisor’s functions, with 
frequent references to the Gender Advisor ensuring or supporting the work (NATO ACO 
ACT 2017, 19–20). NATO’s understanding of a Gender Advisor’s role is now summarised 
as, ‘… to raise awareness of the different needs and contributions of women, men, girls and 
boys in a conflict or post-conflict environment’ (NATO Public Diplomacy Division 2017, 
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59). One thus sees a stronger recognition of the participation element of the Women, Peace 
and Security Agenda.  
Gender Advisors’ Understanding of their Role and Goals 
In describing their goals as Gender Advisors, some emphasised the formal goals of their job 
description, others spoke more personally about their individual motivations. Some 
emphasised what we would understand as institutional gender mainstreaming: incorporating 
gender in the mission or organisation’s own policies, processes and training. Nonetheless, 
almost all described their goals in terms of improving things for women in areas of conflict, 
in a manner that maps onto the priorities of the Women, Peace and Security agenda: 
protection of women, including against gender-based violence; participation of women and 
incorporation of their views in reconstruction and in the security sector; and generally 
improving women’s opportunities, rights and life conditions.  
I am convinced that I work for a good purpose, especially the goals of 1325: 
a better protection of women and children in the (post) conflict zones and 
giving them a voice and make the world listen to them, by trying to give them 
the opportunities to participate in the peace processes and reconstruction of 
their country (Veronica) 
 A minority articulated their goals in instrumentalist terms. William, for example, argued that 
improving things for women will make a society less likely to harbour insurgents. This 
framing was far from dominant, however.  
Most Gender Advisors expressed a striking personal committed to the goals of the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda. Some described it as having become a vocation: ‘I felt like ‘I’ve 
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come home, I’ve actually found what I think I was destined to do’’ (Wendy). Many explicitly 
identified as feminists. Carla and Marco drew a distinction between working on gender or 
equal opportunities, and feminism, placing them in the category of ‘feminists by any other 
name’ (as Katzenstein (1999) described the military women in her study of feminist protest 
within institutions, who rejected the label but who were clearly committed to feminist goals). 
Gender Advisors’ feminism ranged from what might be considered liberal feminism, 
concerned with promoting equality of opportunity for women, to a more radical, 
transformational vision.  
I am so much a feminist … they would be horrified if they knew how much 
I'm a feminist.  [Laughing] Then they wouldn't let me into the, you know, the 
closed zones. (Agnes) 
I have to share or give away from some of the power I have as a man. 
(William) 
Most of our interviewees did describe using arguments around how gender perspectives 
improve mission effectiveness in communicating their work, the fusion of military 
effectiveness goals and the feminist-inspired Women, Peace and Security goals in a similar 
manner to NATO’s policy framework. They did not see these goals as in tension with each 
other; rather a win-win situation. Gender Advisor’s trust in their national military’s and 
NATO’s goals as to bring stability and security to other nations, of course, reveals the 
different worldviews that divide feminists in the military from feminist antimilitarists.  
Military Gender Advisors’ achievements  
 20. 
NATO’s own external presentation of the work of its Gender Advisors is largely extremely 
positive (cited in Coomaraswamy 2015, 258; see also Whose Security? Practical examples of 
gender perspectives in military operations 2015). The most comprehensive reviews of their 
work have been upbeat overall. Egnell, Hojem, and Berts’ presented Gender Advisors’ as 
having ‘made a gender perspective a real and permanent feature of Swedish contributions to 
international operations’ (2012, vi: see also Lackenbauer and Langlais 2013, 35–6; 
Operational Effectiveness and UN Resolution 1325 - Practices and Lessons from 
Afghanistan, 2009). We asked Gender Advisors what they felt had been their key successes. 
Their responses are scrutinised in two directions.: first, internal: in terms of changing 
mindsets within their military structures as regards women and the relevance of gender (an 
aspect of regendering, discussed above) and changing their colleagues’ working practices; 
second, external: in terms of impacts upon communities -  improving security for women and 
men, and increasing women’s participation. 
Changes in military practice and mindsets 
Overwhelmingly, Gender Advisors tended to describe their success in terms of 
‘institutionalisation’ and ‘integration’ of procedures to include gender perspectives. The 
Gender Advisors generally conveyed a sense of slow but steady progress in acceptance of the 
relevance of gender to militaries, and processes to facilitate consideration of it in military 
operations. Lackenbauer and Langlais’ 2013 review had found that ISAF Gender Advisors 
had little structure for their work, having to decide on their own focus and tasks. The more 
recently deployed Gender Advisors we interviewed described established processes for 
Gender Advisors’ engagement in planning, identification of goals and indicators; more access 
to command; and fuller staffing of Gender Advisor posts. Those who been involved in the 
Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which commenced in January 2015, described 
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gender as integrated in the Mission’s indicators and reporting mechanisms; operational plans 
and standard operating procedures; facilities, activities, budgets; and focusing not only upon 
women but upon influencing men.  
Some Gender Advisors describe a key mark of progress as the recognition by the command 
that integrating gender perspective is their responsibility, advised and supported by their 
Gender Advisor, rather than the responsibility of the Gender Advisor.  
When it started in 2008 … they put a lot of responsibility on the Gender Field 
Advisor.  And then it was very easy to criticise the work because it's very 
difficult to be successful if you're, like, alone and … no one really knows 
what is this about … now the organisation has a full understanding and 
acceptance of this, and that is that the work of integrating a gender 
perspective should always be the Commander’s … So absolutely, absolutely 
it has evolved. (Agnes) 
Another ISAF Gender Advisor recounted being in a senior staff meeting in which the 
commander asked who was going to a conference organised by Afghan women. When eyes 
slid to the Gender Advisor, the commander said, ‘I am on board. We will push this button. 
And if I do it, you have to do it too’ (meaning they all had to go to the conference). Although 
describing gender as a ‘button’ raises questions, the Gender Advisor interpreted this as the 
commander reiterating the importance for all parts of the Mission of engaging with Afghan 
women. As evidence of institutionalisation through the headquarters or operation, a number 
of Gender Advisors described colleagues independently including gender in planning 
documents or analyses. Many highlighted changing their colleagues’ mindset as regard the 
relevance of gender.  
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Security and women’s empowerment 
A number of Gender Advisors gave examples of how their advice had been used to mitigate 
the harm that NATO’s own activities might pose to women. Some mentioned using a gender 
perspective in analysing intelligence so as to mitigate ‘collateral damage’ in NATO targeting. 
One described broadening consultation with local communities to include women, so to 
understand what roads they used, to be able to avoid them. One spoke of ‘prevent[ing] an 
American General killing some women’ by advising on how funding might be provided to 
community projects without inflaming local rivalries. Gender Advisors, however, most often 
described their successes as hoped-for impacts of their individual contacts with local women: 
having facilitated their coming together, inspiring them to join the security forces, motivating 
them. 
The first thing I wrote was a zero… [but] I met Afghan women and would 
see them six months later with burkhas off, talking to soldiers, trying to 
negotiate for funds … maybe a little drop that fills up the bucket, for me, that 
is enough. (Workshop participant) 
I hope that I have motivated one woman to not give up and keep fighting for 
women’s rights. (Workshop participant) 
A number of Gender Advisors had worked to support Afghan security forces in integrating 
women, and felt that their advocacy with the Afghan authorities to emphasise the importance 
of women’s participation had been successful. One talked about directly supporting female 
police through helping them to set up their own network; another about Gender Advisors’ 
support to centres and protection units dealing with gender based violence. Others talked 
about being role models for Afghan women to join the security forces. We noticed that, 
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although the description of a Gender Advisor’s role in Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1 refers to 
gender analysis and collection of data, none identified progress by reference to measured 
changes in, for example, prevalence of acts of violence or community perceptions of 
security.7  They did not claim systematic positive impacts upon the lives of communities 
affected by conflict or by NATO operations; rather small wins and hopeful signals.  
Military Gender Advisors’ challenges 
Previous analysis of Military Gender Advisors in NATO operations identified a range of 
problems: resistance by peers, inadequate resourcing for the scope of their tasks, and lack of 
authority to fulfil their responsibilities (Egnell et al., 2012; Lackenbauer and Langlais, 2013; 
Kesteloo, 2015). NATO insiders questioned whether one individual could have all the skills 
and knowledge to meet the very broad requirements of the role (Prescott, 2013, p. 58), and 
whether the ISAF Gender Advisors’ understanding of local gender dynamics was adequate 
(Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, 2014). From interviewing Dutch Gender Advisors, Kesteloo 
concluded that they were ‘shunned and found irrelevant to the conduct of the operation,’ their 
lack of technical knowledge and inability to enforce action led them to have ‘minimal’ effects 
(2015, pp. 29, 33). We asked Gender Advisors to reflect upon the challenges to their work. 
They key issues they highlighted were colleagues’ resistance to accepting gender as relevant, 
                                                             
 
7 NATO commentators on drafts of this paper highlighted the Gender Functional Planning Guide published in 
July 2015 to improve gender analysis, and that Periodic Mission Reviews in ISAF, KFOR and Resolution 
Support Missions have been supposed to include gender analysis. Just one of our interviewees mentioned 
periodic gender reporting within Resolution Support Mission. 
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inadequate resources and, in mission, incomplete understanding of their context. Collectively 
these contributed to frustration amongst some with the military’s gender work being 
magnified for political ends, whilst concrete achievements were few and fragile.  
Resistance 
All of our respondents, when asked about the key challenges they face, highlighted 
resistance, including but not limited to lack of command support – the quality of which 
seemed to be entirely dependent upon the personality and inclination of each commander. 
Within missions, resistance manifested in varied ways: refusing to meet with the Gender 
Advisor, failing to put the Gender Advisor on invitation lists for meetings or distribution lists 
for documents, refusing to provide security and logistics support, or disparaging their work. 
The perceived roots of resistance were myriad. Some said that colleagues perceived having 
female advisors was insensitive to Afghan culture. Fiona described the assumption that a 
Gender Advisor was there to ‘bang on about women’s issues’. Gender Advisors continually 
confronted a lack of understanding of the relevance of gender to the mission’s activities, 
summed by Wendy as: ‘We don’t need to know about women and equality and stuff ‘cause 
we just go and kill people and we’re only interested in traditional warfare.’ In national 
headquarters, resistance manifested in persistent gaps between policy and education, and 
operationalizing. 
… we can have, you know, a few champions, … We can have money. We can 
have the political documents being there. But whenever people ask, ‘Well, 
give me an example of how you’ve implemented this in your armed forces,’ I 
can’t say anything … how we’ve achieved something in a military operation 
… I don’t have a single example. (Kristin) 
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Many Gender Advisors felt that talking about gender equality is, of itself, perceived as 
threatening by military audiences. Some spoke about the masculine culture within the 
military, and resistance to the special status and privileges attached to elite males in the 
military being threatened. 
The people that don’t support it and don’t like it … ‘cause they wonder how 
it’s gonna affect them, how it’s gonna disenfranchise them. How it’s gonna 
take their power away (Fiona) 
Resources 
A key resource constraint is that many Gender Advisor positions within NATO remain 
unfilled; described by one Gender Advisor as illustrating the gap between real and stated 
political commitment. In Afghanistan, scarcity of translators, female interpreters and 
transport and protection to move around outside their compounds meant that many Gender 
Advisors had little access to the local women and men, senior female Afghan personnel and 
international organisations they were directed to engage.  
I had a couple of meetings with sort of Afghan women police, but apart from 
that I didn’t have the engagement with the locals that I would have liked to 
have had, which I think would have helped me to inform more about what we 
should be trying to do to support security sector reform. (Wendy) 
They did not have budget for projects to assist local women. These were challenges identified 
by Egnell, Hojem, and Berts and in Lackenbauer and Langlais’ 2013 review, clearly 
persisting. They suggest continuing mismatch between the scope of the Gender Advisor role 
as defined by NATO, and the commitment of resources to it.  
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Limited technical gender skills and understanding of the local context 
As well as precluding the external engagement aspect of their role, lack of mobility made it 
extremely difficult for the Gender Advisors in Afghanistan to analyse gendered security 
needs. This contributed, for many, to a broad sense of being underinformed and unprepared. 
While we interviewed only one Gender Advisor working in Kosovo, contrastingly, she 
described having developed a contact network with local women’s NGOs and individual 
women. The workshop participants who had deployed to Afghanistan as Gender Advisors 
over both ISAF and Resolute Support Mission complained that they had received insufficient 
intelligence and cultural briefings. They were aware that they lacked knowledge about the 
role of femininities and masculinities in Afghan culture, and the dangers and risks in 
approaching issues, feeling themselves ‘sent there blind’. They described potential 
unintended consequences of NATO’s gender initiatives, such as women encouraged to join 
the Afghan security forces being put at risk of sexual harassment or abuse, and backlash 
against female police personnel given special training opportunities. William likewise 
described how Afghan women highlighted the risks of their engagement with NATO: 
 
They told us, with us pinpointing … Key Leaders amongst the women, we 
actually made things worse because they thought that we gave them Western 
ideas and a Western way of looking at democracy … Some of the women 
would also afraid that when we leave … with them being targeted especially 
meant that they would actually get much worse when we leave … It’s my firm 
belief still that we never actually understood the complexity of the situation 
in Afghanistan. And we have tried to make the best of it. (William) 
 27. 
The workshop participants recognised that reports from international organisations might 
have been a useful source of information about gender issues in Afghanistan, but were left to 
find these for themselves; doing so was time consuming and they did not know where to 
look. They did not have the time nor budget to formally request such information through 
military channels. 
Gender Advisors are not, like cultural analysts within some militaries, anthropologists, nor 
have they local language skills. The Gender Advisors in this study described having highly 
varied levels of formal education and training on concepts linked to gender and sexual 
discrimination, legal frameworks, approaches to and tools for gender analysis: from none, to 
having completed university courses on gender or Women, Peace and Security. None 
mentioned prior experience of conducting gender analysis in conflict-affected countries. Only 
some of the Gender Advisors had done NATO’s officially required Gender Advisor training 
(which NATO apparently cannot enforce). Even for those who had, this is not mission-
specific. Although some mentioned knowing nothing about gender before they started, they 
generally conveyed confidence that the associated skills could be self-taught or picked up on 
the job. Although very satisfied with his gender work, Marco came closest to identifying a 
lack of technical skills for gender work within NATO structures and missions. He described a 
gap between individuals having ‘gender perspective’ – awareness of gender as an analytical 
lens - and having ‘gender capacity’ as a staff function, including a capacity to plan; and 
further education being needed to progress from one to the other.  
These challenges around ability to engage with communities, understanding of context, 
training and skills reinforce Azarbaijani-Moghaddam’s critique of early ISAF Gender 
Advisors. As a civilian cultural advisor to ISAF, her observations were that the Gender 
Advisors lacked the skills to conduct gender analysis of the institutions with which they 
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worked, and the complexities of their operational environment, that they operated at a 
distance from local realities. She was critical of Gender Advisors’ lack of resources and the 
overall NATO approach to gender as ‘plagued by persistent misunderstanding, mechanistic 
and simplistic assumptions’ and ‘complete ignorance of the time, personnel, technical skills, 
qualifications, analytical skills and experience required to undertake meaningful gender 
interventions’ (2014, 22).  
The gap between rhetoric and reality 
In describing achievements above, we highlighted how some Gender Advisors perceived 
steady progress in institutionalisation. Others were pessimistic about the institutionalisation 
of gender perspectives, describing them as partial and lacking within their national structures. 
They emphasize the exceptional nature of gender work: they were deployed without what 
they considered proper briefing and training, and not asked to do the usual end-of-tour 
reporting on return to their home military. Inga emphasised that systems to integrate gender 
are still fragile, with good practices vulnerable to being ‘lost’. There was a degree of 
cynicism among some Gender Advisors, who expressed frustration at gender being used to 
make a person, institution or nation ‘look good’ without due recognition of the resistance and 
shortcomings. 
I think that there is this big problem with speaking only about the good things 
… and I think many people working with gender, we try to not to speak so 
much about the resistance we meet because, because that might spill over on 
ourselves.  … Doing things to make things look good, you know. That's, sort 
of, an objective itself … This political blah, blah, blah, talked about this like 
we are fantastic, and it is fantastic, and you know, it isn't so fantastic. (Inga) 
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… When they want to do some kind of co-operation with other countries this 
is an issue easy to develop, not very expensive, which gives a lot of visibility. 
(Philip) 
Those working on gender in national headquarters often highlighted the gap between policy 
and the implementation of commitments to gender mainstreaming and Women, Peace and 
Security. Like Inga above, a number attributed the slow progress, both at NATO and national 
levels, to institutionalise, develop and resource gender work to a lack of real value attached to 
gender mainstreaming in military operations.  
Conclusions 
There are always gender advisors that have gone back to their office and 
been crying in frustration … But it's getting better though. (Hanna) 
This paper explores whether and how Military Gender Advisors may be catalysing change in 
militaries and military operations; change, in terms of the feminist goals motivating and 
channelled through the Women, Peace and Security Agenda. Many Gender Advisors 
expressed their goals in terms of women’s security, rights, opportunities and participation in 
conflict-affected areas, echoing feminist aims. This is encouraging, given the instrumentalist 
framing of Women, Peace and Security in NATO’s policy and operational directives. The 
Gender Advisors we spoke to were, in the most, attentive to quite complex understandings of 
gender as a power relation. Some were familiar with and thoughtful as regards feminist 
critiques of militarism. Prominent was a strong awareness of the need for gender change not 
only in the countries to which they deployed, but also in their own militaries and societies, 
and dissatisfaction as to the pace of this change.   
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The scope of Gender Advisors’ task is huge, and the challenges that they speak of – the 
resistance, the lack of resources, and their rudimentary preparation – are extensive and 
pervasive. Many Gender Advisors did, nonetheless, share encouraging stories of small 
successes in supporting local women, which should not be disregarded. Gender Advisors saw 
their clearest successes in the institutionalisation of gender in the mission or headquarters. To 
understand how these measures in turn impact upon local people’s security and women’s 
participation would require a different research methodology, such as impact evaluation.8 
However, what measures to institutionalise do signify, and the Gender Advisors testify to, is 
some change in mindsets amongst colleagues: a growing understanding of gender analysis 
and women’s roles as significant to security, and a willingness to think about gender in doing 
their work. We see this as positive, if modest, indications of regendering – sparks of 
regendering - having gender on the agenda and caring about women, in the terms described 
by Cockburn and Hubic. 
It should not be overlooked, however, that some of the successes identified by Gender 
Advisors illustrate the tensions between feminist visions of Women, Peace and Security and 
military applications. The protection element of Gender Advisors’ work was primarily 
described in terms of mitigating risks from NATO patrols and shelling.  Where Gender 
Advisors are engaged in promoting women’s involvement in national security services, but 
where women and men working in those institutions are unprotected from harassment and 
                                                             
 
8 Noting that NATO’s Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women, Peace and Security is advocating that NATO 
conduct regular impact assessments of its Women, Peace and Security work and gendered impact assessments 
of NATO operations and missions (Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women Peace and Security 2017, 22). 
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abuse, is this success, and if so, for whom and at whose cost? Likewise, the suggestion that 
NATO’s identification of certain Afghan women as ‘key leaders’ put them at risk of reprisal 
illustrates the sensitivity and care with which military engagement with civil society and 
interventions concerning women’s rights must be designed. The Gender Advisors in 
Afghanistan, however, described only the most general knowledge of local gender roles and 
relations and gendered insecurities, and were generally denied the necessary resources to 
acquire this knowledge. None of the Gender Advisors described any structured approach to 
understanding the cultural, political and economic context of their work, such as conducting 
assessments of security issues, consultation on specific topics, or seeking baseline data from 
secondary sources. These shortcomings could be interpreted, in the tradition of feminist 
antimilitarism, as evidence that militaries will never have the skill sets needed for effective 
gender work, and should leave it to civilian agencies, NGOs and the like. Alternatively, if 
advocating for regendered, better militaries, as evidence that militaries need new types of 
education and training (including comprehensive technical training on approaches and tools 
for gender mainstreaming), and considerable increases in resources, to be fit for purpose for 
contemporary peacekeeping, stabilisation, and training missions. Making such changes, 
however, would require will within NATO as an institution and at national level to confront 
the current gaps between rhetoric and reality. 
Anti-militarist feminists make compelling arguments, revealing and challenging assumptions 
about the inevitability and legitimacy of military responses to complex challenges and 
insecurities. Their assumption that militaries cannot become more able to tackle these 
insecurities we find too pessimistic, however, in view of the indications in our research that 
Military Gender Advisors can be agents of institutional change, given at least basic 
institutional support. They can, as they reported to us, change mindsets on an individual level, 
initiating conversations about equality and discrimination, challenging colleagues as to their 
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attitudes. Moreover, they can, and have, introduced innovations in processes and practices 
that direct attention to the specific needs of women, girls and boys in conflict, and how 
military interventions might affect them. Military Gender Advisors' achievements may be 
modest; yet this is how change happens in large institutions: incrementally. The Gender 
Advisors we spoke with appeared to us as feminists operating at the margins to try and force 
openings for change, adapting their strategies to navigate obstacles, maintaining commitment 
in the face of repudiation. Military Gender Advisors resemble how feminists within other 
bureaucracies operate facing the challenge of transforming huge, gendered institutions as a 
small minority of ‘institutional entrepreneurs,’ or change agents (Caglar et al, 2013; Eyben 
and Turquet 2013). In viewing the potential for such change within militaries and military 
operations optimistically, we are mindful of the inevitability of ‘small wins’ when feminist 
insiders seek to change established institutions. Far from feminists wasting their time, 
Military Gender Advisors are clawing their institutions forward, toward better alignment with 
the vision of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, and toward being more attentive to 
power dynamics between men and women, both their own and in society. While cognisant 
that this alone will not achieve the transformative vision of feminist peace, without war, 
whilst we still have a world where militaries are being used to address profound insecurity, 
Military Gender Advisors may help militaries to do this better.  
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